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EMERGING CHALLENGES FOR FINANCIAL
REGULATION AT NATIONAL LEVEL
*Mritunjay Kumar
Abstract
Through this article effort has been made to identify key regulatory
tasks and objectives of RBI as regulator of key financial markets. The
Increase in systemic risk due to greater integrity of the Indian market
with the global market and with emergence
of new markets
and
instruments have made the task of regulator most dijficult as it has to
constantly keep up pace with the changing marketplace and prescribe
new regulatory safeguards for all market participants.
The effort is to
make unregulated
or poorly regulated markets & instruments
under
better regulation. However, there are border problem between
regulators
over the domain of the financial markets & institutions. The paper tries
to discuss the policy dilemmas and option to tackle emerging
challenges,
need to revisit the regulatory framework to make it more effective. It
also discusses Pro-cyclicality as a special case of systemic risk and the
need to move from Basel-II to Basel-Ill to ensure adequate bank liquidity
during the credit crunch situations.
This will however affect
the
regulatory capital the banks need to keep towards capital charge of its
risky asset and the provision of additional capital buffer in the form of
contra-cyclical capital will be anything but easy in implementation
due
to significant
technical work required in understanding
of business
cycles. Finally, areas of further research have been identified in the
paper

INTRODUCTION
Emerging challenges of financial regulation
Key Regulatory Tasks & Objective of Financial Regulation: To ensure
financial Stability

*Studenl EFPM (2009-13). XLRI, Jamshedpur & Working for SBI.
Email: mritunjayk6@gmail.com
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What are the key challenges in the path of achieving this financial
stability?
•

Increase in the systemic risk

•

Greater integrity of the Indian market with the global market

•

Emergence ofnew markets & instruments

Cause & Effects of these new developments
•

Unregulated or poorly regulated - o f these markets & instruments

•

Border problem between regulators over the domain ofthe financial markets,
institutions & instruments.

Cause of worry?
•

These unregulated markets & instruments and the border problem between
the regulators leads to regulatory arbitrage.

•

Can policy agreements and regulations change the behavior of the various
actors?

Policy Dilemmas and Policy option to tackle emerging challenges
•

Macroeconomic regulation Vs. Microeconomic regulation.

•

To resolve the border problem.

•

To look at the regulatory framework under new development to make it
more effective.

•

Option to movefi-omrule-based regulation to principle-based regulation.

Pro-cyclicality a special case of systemic risk
Final set of recommendations
•

Basel m

•

Regulatory Capital & Capital Buffer

Management Dynamics, Volume 10, Number 2 (2010)

Emerging Challenges for Financial Regulation at National Level

45

KEYREGULATORYTASKS AND OBJECTIVES OFFINANCIAL
REGULATION
The gtobalfinancialcrisis has shown that even with price and macroeconomic
stability, financial instability is a distinct possibility. One of the key goals of the
financial regulation is financial stability. "Financial stability is interpreted as a
persistent state of robust fiinctioning of various financial system componentsmarkets, institutions and infi-astructures-endowing the system to face any
endogenous or exogenousfinancialshock with minimal disruptive impact."(RBI,
Report, March 2010). Post-crisis, financial stability has emerged as an important
objective for central banks across countries in the world.In the Indian context,
what has provided a systemic advantage and a sound model for financial stability
is that the Reserve Bank, besides being the regulator for banks as well as nonbanking finance companies, is also vested with the regulation of key financial
markets, viz., money market, government securities market, foreign exchange
market and credit market, in which banks are the dominant players. Hence, the
channels of interconnectedness between banks and other financial sector entities
are within the regulatory perimeter of the Reserve Bank.

KEY CHALLENGES IN THE PATH OF ACHIEVING THIS
FINANCUL STABILITY?
Increase in the Systemic Risk
Liberalization ofnational and international markets has resulted in a significant
increase in systemic risk. The borders between different financial activities are
being eroded. Banks are selling insiirance-like products and insurance companies
are selling banking products. Insurance companies are selling investment-like
products (eg., ULIPS). In the developed world, CDS (Credit Defeult Swaps),
which were akin to Insurance products, were sold as Derivatives. In some cases
financial conglomerations are being established, spawning the entire spectrum of
financial products. Moreover, the trade infinancialinstruments has developed to
such an extent that the risks are being spread to a greater number of agents than
before, even outside the pale ofbanking and insurance con^anies. In this febrile
environment, the regulator needs a coherent theoretical understanding of the
emergence and proliferation of systemic risk, as well as a pragma* : understanding
of markets and institutions and a thorough grasp on the evolving tools to manage
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risk. Whilst financial markets are "seamless", they are not homogeneous. In
consequence, uniform financial regulations often have quite different practical
effects. The result is that unifomi codes will expose thefinancialsystem to different
systemic risks in the Ught of their differential impact in different jurisdictions
(Alexander and Dhumale, 2000).
Given the complexity ofthe financial system, it is unrealistic to expect that a
single measure of systemicriskwill suffice. Any comprehensive collection of risk
measure should capture the following characteristics ofthe entire financial system:
•

leverage

•

liquidity

•

correlations

•

concentration

•

sensitivities; and

•

connectedness

Greater integrity of the Indian market with the global market
Though the direct impact ofthefinancialcrisis on India was relatively muted,
the knock-on effects on the Indian economic andfinancialsystem were discernible,
indicative of India's rapid and growing integration into the global economy. The
capital inflows in India are rising rapidly and there are global concerns over rising
inflows posing fresh risk to the financial stability. Increasing capital inflows was
identified as a "policy challenge" that could "pose significant risks to the financial
stability" not only in India but also Asia. That large inflow/outflow ofFIIs (foreign
institutional investors) fiind will bring volatility in the Indian market and their
increasing interconnectedness with the global financial system will affect the other
market as well. Though ministry of finance and the RBI keeps a watch on the
level ofthe capital inflows and will be geared into action to press the panic button,
should such flows reach an alarming level in the Indian economy.

Emergence of new markets & instruments
Over the past few decades, the most difBcult task of the fmancial regulator
has been to keep up with the changing marketplace that he or she is supposed to
be regulating. The speed of change has, if anything, accelerated, with the
Management Dynamics, Volume 10, Number 2 (2010)

Emerging Challenges for Financial Regulation at National Level

47

continuous development ofnew trading strategies and new "products", linking
assets, markets and currencies in new ways and creating new risks.The complex
and multi-layered securitization market has been identified as one of the causes
ofthe sub-prime turmoil The inportant regulatory safeguards are elements related
to risk retention by the originator and amortization of profits arising out of
securitization. The focus is also on siir^jlification of securitization and increased
disclosures. Regulatory instructions in force in India prescribe safeguards such
as restrictions on recognition of true sale and on up-fi-ont booking ofprofits.

CAUSE & EFFECTS OF THE NEW DEVELOPMENTS
Unregulated or poorly regulated -of these markets & instruments
The global crisis is attributed to some extent to the lack ofpmdential regulation
for the investment banks in USA. Investment Bank term not in use in India is
synonymous with entities predominantly carrying out fee based services like trading
in securities, or as portfolio managers, merchant Bankers, underwriters, brokers
and those oflFering advisory services. Investment banks in India are regulated by
SEBI. Their capacity to leverage is limited. The risks arise fi-omthe linkages of
otherfinancialinstitutions, including their group companies, with these investment
banks. There is need to bring unregulated institutions, markets and instruments
uixler the regulatory framework and the framework itselfwill need to be redesigned
to address the emerging needs at both national and international levels. The
contribution to the current crisis of certain financial institutions, markets and
innovative instruments that were either unregulated or lightly regulated has
highlighted the need forfinancialsector policymakers to redefine the perimeter of
the regulatory framework. Examples of such institutions and instruments include
mortgage brokers/originators, investment banks, securitization vehicles, credit
rating agencies, as well as hedgefiindsand other private asset pools. Internationally,
a view is emerging that large, systemically inportant banking institutions should
be restricted in undertaking proprietary activities that present particularly high
risks and serious conflict of interests. The sponsorship and management of private
pools of capital by banks should ordinarily be prohibited and large proprietary
trading should be limited by strict capital and liquidity requirements. The RBI is
working towards developing a prudential fiamework for banks' management of
private pools of capital. It is believed that "The shadow bankin^, system"- hedge
fiinds and proprietary trading operations- has contributed to systemic risk and
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can be a valuable source of "early warning signals" for broader dislocation in
financial markets. The so called "shadow banking system'-consists of investment
banks, hedge funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, pension funds,
endowments and foundations, and brokers and dealers and related intermediaries.
One ofthe suggestions forwarded was that new regulation should focus on financial
functions rather than institutions, making them moreflexibleand adaptive. There
is need to standardize an over-the-counter (OTC) contract and create an
organized exchange for it. Certain parts of the financial industry require more
transparency. Without more conq)rehensive data on characteristics such as assets
under management, leverage, counterparty relationsh^s, and portfolio holdings,
it is virtually impossible to draw conclusive inferences about the level of systemic
risk in the financial sector.

Border problem between regulators over the domain of the financial
markets, institutions & instruments
Financial groups, through networks of legal entities and structures, offer a
wide range of financial services and are often active across multiple jurisdictions
and with multiple interdependencies. Financial groups because of their economic
reach and the mix of regulated and unregulated entities (such as special purpose
entities and unregulated holding conpanies) blur the boundaries among the sectors
and present challenges for the application of sector-specific financial regulation.
Sometimes it is unclear which authority makes the decisions, or which authority
has the power to decide on a particular issue, because the law is unclear or
because it is not followed in practice. This lack of clarity is accentuated in a crisis
situation and hampers crisis management. It is inportant to establish clear roles
and areas of responsibility between public authorities within the same country,
between authorities in different countries and also between the authorities and
thefinancialinstitutions. For a large, conplexfinancialinstitution there are mult^le
"home" and "host" regulators. Considering the speed at which a crisis can evolve
it can be difficult for aU interested authorities to communicate effectively and have
access to information and actions taken in other jurisdictions which are relevant
for their markets. The global crisis has thrown up the inportance of dealing with
systemically Important Financial institutions (SIFIs). In the Indian context, the
global operations of SIFIs, termedfinancialconglomerates in India, are not very
significant and the need for supervisory colleges for such institutions may not be
necessary at this juncture. Within the country, there already exists a monitoring
Management Dynamics, Volume 10, Number 2 (2010)
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and oversight framework offinancialconglomerates where three major regulators
viz. the Reserve Bank, SEBI and IRDA are involved. Of the 12 identified financial
conglomerates, the principal regulator is the Reserve Bank in eight cases, IRDA
in three cases and SEBI in one case.

Presently various entities and markets are regulated by different kind of
regulators.
Markets / entities
being Regulated
Banks

Regulator

Equities, Corporate
Bond market,
Exchange traded
derivatives, mutual
fund industry
NBFCs

SEBI

Pension Funds

RBI /NABARD

RBI / Ministry of
Corporate Affairs
PFRDA

Marliets / entities
being Regulated
Housing Finance
Companies
Govenmient
securities market,
Money market, and
Foreign exchange
market
Insurance companies

Regulator
National Housing
Banks
RBI

IRDA

Risks and vulnerabilities may M between different authorities' or countries'
fields of responsibility and thereby may go unnoticed. Or, if they are noticed,
territorial conflicts may arise, making it more difficult to inclement the measures
needed. It may also be unclear where the risks will end up. There is need for
increased harmonization of regulations and supervision, both between sectors
and between countries.

CAUSE OF WORRY
Regulatory arbitrage
Regulatory arbitrage is a process by which regulatory capital is reduced
through instruments such as credit derivatives or securitisation, without an
equivalent reduction ofthe actual risk being taken. Regulatory arbitrage is where
a regulated institution takes advantage of the difference between its real (or
economic) risk and the regulatory po sition. Under Basel Accord, a bank has to
hold 9% capital of the risk weighted assets. If the real risk of default is less, the
Bank would still have to hold 9% of default risk. The bank vould try to reduce
its minimum capital requirement by reduction of its better quafity assets through
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securitization which allows for transfer ofassets. The securitization he^s in raising
funds and inproving the liquidity position without increasing the on-balance sheet
liabilities and capital base. This will however alter the real risk profile of the
financial institutions, as securitisation allows reducing capital cost without adequate
transfer of risk.Regulatory arbitrage is a perfectly legal plan used to avoid taxes,
accounting rules, securities disclosure, and other regulatory costs. It undermines
the efficiency ofregulatory conpetition, shifts the incidence of regulatory costs,
and fosters a lack of transparency and accountability that undermines the rule of
law. Some arbitrage techniques are pervasive and accepted as part of the system,
like harvesting tax losses at year-end by holding the winners in one's stock portfolio
while selling the losers and replacing them with similar stocks.
Basel n is supposed to be the framework that attempts to align the economic
and regulatory capital more closely to reduce the scope for regulatory arbitrage.
Basel n provides for three alternative capital calculations. Basel n is a mandatory
framework which allows for a wide range of variations such as different
approaches, different deadlines, different options, different national discretions
etc. These different approaches and options make some countries "flexflDle" that
create opportunities for them to retain or attract foreign direct. For example.
Hedge funds select the more favorable jurisdictions, playing one government
against another.
Basel III too looks like a menu approach, and countries will be able to do
more or less, sooner or later. The new definition of the Tier 1 capital will have
huge impact on healthy (under Basel 2) banks. Some banks for years rely on
hybrid equity that may now not meet the new Basel HI requirement. For example,
there is a form of non-voting bank capital in Germany, known as "silent
participations", which do not absorb losses as long as a bank is still in business.
If Tier 1 capital is less than 9%, banks will not be allowed to pay dividends
to shareholders. Investor will be scared. In good times, banks have to allocate
another 3%, the "anti-cyclical buffer ". It sin:q)ly means that in good times banks
need Tier 1 capital of 12'/o in order to be able to pay dividends. This is likely to
affect our purpose ofi^nancial inclusion.In India, the major difference in the
regulatory environmeat between Banks and NBFCs are: Low coital requirement
for NBFCs Rs.20 aiillion as aginst Rs 200/300 million for new banks.Lower
SLR ratio for NFFCs 15% as against 25% for banks, No cash reserve ratio for
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NBFCs, Higher capital adequacy ratio forNBFCs ranging from 12 to 15 %
depending on the type of business.

Can policy agreements and regulations change the behavior of various
actors?
The Banks voice resistance as regulators says tough Basel norms are just a
start. They feel that the more financial rules especially for the largest firms deny
them a level playing field and impede growth. There are growing signs that global
coordination isfizzlingand unilateral actions are pending. International Institute
of Finance Chairman, JosefAckermann feel that "Global banks will have to
comply with the higher rules in every jurisdiction, regardless oftheir home base.
That will steal from credit to companies and hurt job creation." The lobbying
groups will rally around the national regulators to relax the rules.The national
regulators & policymakers promote their individual & group countries eflfort which
run counter to the policies reached at such world forum There did not seem any
commitment to change behavior. There are concerns that countries are relying on
cheap currencies to aid growth. China is accused of undervaluing the Yuan,
while low US interest rates were blamed by emerging markets for flooding them
with capital. Capital inflows have the potential to "derail monetary policy".
Misperception of risk- Misperception of risk may be driven by non-rational
behavior. Disaster myopia and cognitive dissonance, two-well known concepts
from experimental psychology, he^ explain why investors may misestimate risk.
Disaster myopia refers to the tendency to underestimate the likelihood of lowprobability, high-loss events, resulting in excessive weight being placed on recent
events and too little on remote ones. Cognitive dissonance refers to the agents'
tendency to read the available information as consistent with their beliefe. These
cognitive biases could generate pro-cyclical risk perceptions: when an economic
expansion proceeds, the memory of past defaults fedes and new information is
interpreted as confirmation that the economy is moving along a sustainable, lowrisk path. Misperception conducive to excessive risk taking can also be driven
by incentives.
Pro-cyclicality in lending and borrowing behavior may have several sources,
which are very often endogenous to financial systems. Tnird, others (see e.g
Borio et al) have argued that pro-cyclicality in lending may stemfrom inappropriate
responses by financial system participants and that bank lending behavior can be
Management Dynamics, Volume 10, Number 2 (2010)

52

Mritunjay Kumar

explained using theories of behavioral finance. Bank lending behavior may be
based on either on euphoric expectations associated with an investment boom
driven by the business cycle (Minsky, 1977) or on disaster myopia where the
subjective probability of a major stock decreases as time elapses since the last
stock (Guttentag and Herring, 1984). Consistent with the latter is the institutional
memory hypothesis developed by Berger and Udell (2003) where the capacity
of loan officers to evaluate risk and identify potential fiiture problems deteriorates
as time passes since the last period during which they experienced large credit
losses. The crisis is preceded by extended periods ofprosperity (Kaminsky and
Reinhart, 1999). During extended period ofprosperity, market participants
become complacent about the risk of loss- either through systematic underestimation ofthose risks because of recent history, or a decline in their risk aversion
due to increasing wealth, or both. Further, the preferences for risk aversion may
not remain stable through time or over circumstances, and are likely to be shaped
depending on the environmental conditions. There is natural predilection ofhuman
behavior to excess, and therefore, this predilection will often not work in tandem
with the regulation.

POLICY DILEMMAS AND OPTION TO TACKLE EMERGING
CHALLENGES
Micro economic regulation vs. Macroeconomic Regulation
The risk taken by individual firms is, in many cases, transmitted macro
economically, and requires that regulation be conceived in conjunction with
macroeconomic policy. Too often today, regulation is seen as an activity that
involves the behavior and interaction of firms, with little or no macroeconomic
dimension. By the very nature of financial risk this is a serious error, and is likely
to lead to serious policy mistakes. A change in macroeconomic variable can lead
to rapid redistributions of the values of assets and liabilities.
Microeconomic reguiation may be a means of reducing systemic risk, but
macroeconomic action may be more efficient. An excellent example of the role
of macro-linkages in the formation of regulatory policy has followed the Asian
financial crisis of 1997-98. It is clear that an important component of the crisis
was the excess foreign-exchange exposure of financial and other institutions in
emerging markers. The buildup of micro institutional risks has resulted in the

Management Dynamics, Volume 10, Number 2 (2010)

Emerging Challenges for Financial Regulation at National Level

53

unfolding of massive macro risk, partly through the rise in unsustainable asset
prices. Prudential regimes should encourage behaviour that supports systemic
stability, discourages regulatory arbitrage; and adopts the concept of "systemic"
risk, fectoring in the effects ofleverage and fimding.In macro prudential regulation,
the focus is not on the soundness of individual financial institutions, but on the
stability of the whole financial system. Currently macro prudential indicators
(MPIs) construct "conpriseboth aggregated micro prudential indicators of the
health of individualfinancialinstitutions and macroeconomic variables associated
with financial system soundness" (Hilbers, Krueger and Moretti, 2000; also,
Evans, Leone, Gill and Hilbers, 2000). There are two flaws in MPIs as currently
conceived. First, the aggregation of the characteristics of individual firms will not
result in an indicator that accurately represents the risk to which the economy is
exposed. For example, the aggregate capital adequacy ratio ofthe financial sector,
one of the indicators collected, could easily conceal major risks - a few prudent
institutions with high ratios disguising the presence of the less prudent. Including
data on the fi-equency distribution of such variables does not fiilly confi-ont this
problem, as the distributions do not capture the nature of the risks taken by
individual institutions. Second, as yet there has been no attempt to link
macroeconomic performance and policy to the incentives surrounding
microeconomic risk-taking.
The Potential macro prudential tools should fiirther indicate the build-up of
leverage, with enhanced sensitivity to ofif-balance sheet exposures; capital
requirement adjustment over thefinancialcycle, etc. From a systemic persp)ective,
the Reserve Bank has been implementing various macro and micro prudential
measures to address banking system risks. In the case of systemically important
non-deposit taking NBFCs (NBFCs-ND-SI), a gradually calibrated regulatory
fi-amework in the form of capital requirements, exposure norms, liquidity
management, asset liability management and reporting requirements has been
extended, which has limited their capacity to leverage and space for regulatory
arbitrage.

Resolving the border problem
The boundary or perimeter challenge is multidimensional. The most obvious
sources ofperimeter or boundary problems are: (1) ofif-balance sheet activities
conducted through over-the-counter derivatives markets and embodied in
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unregulated special piupose vehicles; (2) the national orientation of prudential
oversight despite the existence of systemic cross-border institutions operating in
multiple jurisdictions; (3) the banking orientation of supervisory oversight to the
exclusion of other systemically inportant nonbank financial institutions and (4)
many sources ofregulatory arbitrage within nationalfinancialsystems (for exanple,
Basel related off-balance sheet arbitrage of capital requirements) and across
geographical as well as legal boundaries.There is nofi-ameworkfor the resolution
of cross-border financial groups orfinancialconglomerates. At the national level,
few jurisdictions have afi-ameworkfor the resolution of domesticfinancialgroups
or financial conglomerates. There is no international insolvency fi-amework for
financial firms. National insolvency rules apply on a legal entity basis and may
differ depending on the types of businesses within the financial group.
As the legal system and fiscal responsibility are national, there is
predominance of the territorial approach in resolving banking crisis and
insolvencies. National authorities are concemed that the member institutions under
their jurisdiction bear only those financial burdens that are necessary to mitigate
their risk. To resolve the cross-border crisis or resolution, the need to devise
proper assessment of comparative burden is needed. The present method is
complex due to differing perceptions of the impact of feilure of a cross-border
institution and the willingness or ability of different authorities to bear a share of
the burden. The assessment is affected due to the jurisdiction being home country
or host country, and whether the institution operates through branch or subsidiary.
There are two approaches to the resolution of afinancialinstitution with branches
and assets located in other jurisdiction. First is the universal approach where
resolution of insolvencies is based on the law of a single country. Generally, this is
the place where the insolvent institution has its head office. Under this approach,
the decision of the resolution authority in this jurisdiction extends to branches,
other operations, and assets ofthe insolvent firm in other jurisdictions. Another
approach is based on the principle of territoriality of insolvency. Under the
territorial approach, each national jurisdiction appbes its own law which governs
insolvency proceedings for the entities, operations, and assets of the insolvent
firm located in that jurisdiction.The concepts ofuniversality and territoriality strictly
only describe the way in which national authorities will apply their insolvency and
related resolution processes to individual institutionsAs single universal approach
would be difficult to agree upon, the bilateral agreement or multi-lateral
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arrangement could be reached between home country and host country to share
needed information for contingency planning and resolution during times of stress.
A single National authority could be vested with Special powers to resolve
all significant entities & address systemic risk during the crisis. In India, RBI is
well equipped to coordinate all regulators, as it is also responsible for Monetary
& Fiscal policy.

Looking at the regulatory framework under new development to make it
more effective
There is an effort underway at the global level to realign the regulatory
fi-amework to make the financial system safer, less vulnerable to crisis of the
recent kind and more focused towards the needs of the real sector. Issues are
being debated under the institutional framework of G-20, the FSB and the BCBS,
to develop afixtureperspective on containment of systemic risk and accordingly
orient the regulatory approach towards that end. India is a key member in all
these groups. Ideally, an effectivefi-ameworkfor managing financial instability
should necessarily include an assessment ofthe individual and collective robustness
of the institutions, markets and infi-astructures that make up the financial system,
identification of the main sources of risk and vulnerability that could pose
challenges forfinancialsystem stability in the fliture and an appraisal of the resilience
ofthefinancialsystem in terms of its ability to cope with crisis, ifthe need arise.The
stability fiamework should be able to identify the potential build-up of financial
imbalances by fectoring in possible transmission lags in policy instruments, the
probable consequences of'unknown unknowns', and limitations ofthe modeling
apparatus and stress testing exercise. Accordingly, the fi-amework should be
able to track the observable antecedents of a crisis, such as use of leverage,
maturity mismatches, defeult rates and exposure to asset price bubbles and then
design suitable pohcies.One of the shortcomings of the prevailing Basel II
fi-amework is that it does not fiilly capture the unexpected rise in counterparty
exposures imder stressed conditions. The proposed changes relating to the
counterparty credit risk framework are likely to have capital adequacy implications
for some Indian banks having large OTC bilateral derivatives positions.

Option to move from rule-based regulation to principle-based regulation
The Panel discussed at length as a developmental issue the choice between

Management Dynamics, Volume 10, Number 2 (2010)

56

Mritunjay Kumar

principles-based and rules-based regulation in the Indian context. India follows a
model of regulation which is primarily rule based. The High Powered Expert
Committee on making Mumbai an international financial centre (set up by the
Ministry of Finance) had argued strongly in fevour of a shift to principles-based
regulation to bring about greater flexibility in the regulatory environment, and
make it more adaptable to globalfinancialdemands. SEBI devised a new regime
which has moved awayfi"omthe old merit-based regulation to disclosure-based
and market-based regulation.The insurance sector is in a nascent stage of
development, and given the fact that it was liberised only in 1999/2000, it may
not be appropriate to move to a principle-based regulation. The industry needs
to develop adequate data base and skill sets before moving to principle-based
regulation. Its implementation requires a high degree of market integrity and
maturity Thus, a hybrid approach is prevalent as fer as regulation of intermediaries
is concerned. As regards product regulations, SEBI requires the disclosure of
risk fectors, suitability to investors, avoidance of systemic risk and mis-selling. In
the securities market too, conditions are farfi-omripe to move to principlesbased regulation. Other markets too need to acquire fiirther depth and maturity
before a transition to principles-based regulation can be successfiilly attempted.
The implementation ofprinc^les-based regulation requires a high degree ofmarket
integrity and maturity.

Pro-cyclicality a special case of systemic risk
There is a consensus in the theoretical literature that financial institutions
including banks tend to behave in a pro-cyclical manner. Various reasons for
pro-cyclical measure are herd behavior; disaster myopia and growing conpetition
amongfinancialinstitutions during periods of economic uptum. The Basel II risk
capital regime with its focus on enhanced risk sensitivity became procyclical in
nature and amplified the economic andfinancialshocks. The procyclicality debate
came into sharp focus during the crisis. Banks found themselves constrained in
lending by already shrunk capital ratios owing to losses when more lending would,
in fact, have helped in containing the downtxim. During the good times, the risk
parameters were benign, and therefore the capital requirement was low. However,
during the crisis the banks started svififering losses and the risk parameters became
demanding. So, banks were caught between having less capital and having to
keep more capital for its existence. The banks stopped lending to all but the
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highest rated borrowers thus channeling the funds away from the sectors and
businesses that needed them the most, in turn, pushing these businesses to go for
liquidation or defeult. In the Indian sector, itself there are cases ofbanks conpletely
stopping lending to the SME sector during the last quarter of2008. The banks
were unduly concerned with safety of their funds, and any persuasion by RBI
and the government to the Banks to lend to these sectors could not change their
behavior in short term. To minimize the procyclicality effects, BCBS has proposed
to: (a) base the calculation of capital on more conservative estimates of default
probabilities, (b) promote more forward looking provisions, (c) conserve capital
to build capital buffers at individual banks and the banking sector that can be
used under stress, and (d) manage system-wide risk by containing excess credit
growth. The commonly employed counter cyclical prudential measures are
dynamic provisioning, leverage ratio, capital insurance, counter-cyclical capital
buffers, and time varying capital requirements.
The committee has now tried to address the procyclicality issues and
proposes to use a downturn probability of default (PD) in line with well known
downturn loss given default (LGD). In a move towards forward looking
provisioning, it is also advocating a change in accounting standards to an expected
loss approach in lieu of the current incurred loss approach. Due to the above
measures, banks will have to keep increased capital to meet the regulatory
requirements. The proposed measures to contain the procyclicality of financial
sector regulations through capital buffers and provisioning will impose additional
costs on banks. Apart from general concern in this regard, in India we have an
additional concem about the variable used to cabTjrate the countercyclical capital
buffer. The most widely discussed candidate for this is the credit to GDP ratio.
Unlike the credit GDP ratio is, however, problematic. Unlike in advanced
economics where this ratio is stable, in emerging economies such as India, it will
likely to go up for structural reasons- enhanced credit intermediation owing to
higher growth as well as efforts at deepening financial inclusion. In feet, a study
undertaken by the RBI shows that the credit to GDP ratio has not historically
been a good indicator of build up of systemic risk in our banking system.
Furthermore, some economic sectors such as real estate, housing, micro finance
and consumer credits are relatively new in India and banks have only recently
begun financing them in a big way. The risk build up in such sectors cannot
accurately by captured by the aggregate credit to GDP ratio. We have therefore
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used sectoral approaches to countercyclical policies.
To effectively deploy countercyclical measures we also need to improve
our capabilities to predict business cycles at the aggregate and sectoral levels,
and identify them in real time. This will require better quality of economic and
financial data as well as improved analytical capabilities.

FINAL SET OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Implementation of Basel Core principle and Basel III
All commercial banks have migrated to Basel II requirements as at endmarch 2009 under the Standardized approach. The migration to higher approaches
under Basel II presents significant challenges in respect of requirements of data,
systems, technology and skilled human resources.
Out of 25 core princ^les of Basel, 7 are compliant, 11 are largely conpliant,
6 are materially Non-compliant and 1 is Non compliant. Basel also initiated a
proposal to introduce a transparent and simple leverage ratio to measure and
restrict balance sheet and off-balance sheet leverage of banks, as a supplement
to risk based capital requirements. An assessment of leverage for Indian banks in
March 2009 indicated that while the aggregate ratio was 16.83 times when SLR
securities were included, it fell to 13.65 times on excluding the SLR securities.
An inportant proposal is on card to enhance the oversight of credit rating agencies
and fiirther strengthen the eligibility criteria for their accreditation.
Basel II guidelines were found to be unsuitable to ensure adequate bank
liquidity during the credit crunch conditions. In July 2010, the Basel committee
on banking supervision (BCBS) put out a comprehensive paper indicating the
broad agreement reached on the Basel III proposals. These reforms will require
banks to hold more and better quality capital and to carry more liquid assets, will
limit their leverage and mandate them to build up capital buffers in good times
that can be drawn down in periods of stress. Under Basel III, there is new
proposed ratios called "liquidity coverage ratio "and "New stable fimding ratio"
to measure and monitor liquidity risk. New liquidity risk will promote the short
term resiliency ofthe liquidity risk profile ofInstitutions by ensuring that they have
sufficient high quality liquid resources to survive an acute stress scenario lasting
for one month. Net stable Funding ratio will pronnote resiliency over longer-term
horizons by creating additional incentives for banks to fiind their activities with
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more stable sources of funding on an ongoing structural basis.Under new rules,
the key capital ratio has been raised to 7% of risky assets, Tier-I capital that
includes common equity and perpetual preferred stock will be raised from 2 to
4.5% starting in phase from 2013 to be completed by January 2015. In addition,
banks will have to set aside another 2.5% as a contingency for future stress.
Banks that fail to meet the buffer would be unable to pay dividends, though they
will not be forced to raise cash.The aggregate capital to risk-weighted asset ratio
of the Indian banking system stood at 13.4%, of which Tier-I capital constituted
9.3%. RBI does not expect our banking system to be significantly stretched in
meeting the proposed new capital rules, both in terms of the overall capital
requirement and the quality of capital.

The draft Basel III regulations include:
•

"tighter definition ofTier 1 capital; banks must hold 4.5% by January 2015,
then a further 2.5%, totaling 7%. Predominant part of Tier I capital must be
common shares and retained earnings.

•

the introduction of a leverage ratio, as a supplementary measure to the Basel
II risk-based framework.

•

a framework for counter-cyclical capital buffers,

•

measure to limit counterparty credit risk,

•

and short and medium-term quantitative liquidity ratios.

•

Promoting stronger provisioning practices through forward looking
provisions. The forward looking provision would be based on expected
loss (EL) approach.

•

A global minimum liquidity standard for internationally active banks that
includes a 30-day liquidity coverage ratio requirement underpinned by a
loner-term structural liquidity ratio.

Basel III tries to address the pro-cyclicality issues from individual banks
level to a more macro level by proposing to adjust capital requirements in response
to signals of macro instability. The issue is whether the linkage should be to a
wide measure of credit expansion or risk (e.g. aggregate lending growth), or to a
system-wide leverage, liquidity risk, asset price dynamics. The issue is which
macro variable to consider and how to combine them, especially for cross-border
banks.
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Regulatory capital & Capital Buffer
The proximate objective of countercyclical capital standards is to encourage
banks to build up buffers in good times that can be drawn down in bad ones.
Buffers are unencumbered capital in excess ofthe prudential capital requirement
minimum, so that capital is available to absorb losses in bad times. The objective
is to limit the risk of large-scale strains in the banking system by strengthening its
resilience against shocks. Secondly the buffer will limit the anplifying economic
fluctuations. An underlying rationale for the scheme is that risks tend to build up
in good times, but their consequences materialize only with a considerable time
lag. The buffer will strengthen the defences of each individual institution, and
therefore system as a whole. It will be a challenge for regulators and governments
to resist demands for relaxation ofthe new coital requirements, both the enhanced
minimum levels and the capital buffers proposed in good times. Secondly, the
proposal for provision ofcontra-cycbcal capital willfecesignificant inplementation
issues. Regulators will need to do significant technical work in the understanding
of business cycles so that turning points can be recognised. Thirdly, a broad
agreement on macro prudential regulation and the identification of systemic risks
like the buildup of asset bubbles seems to be emerging. However, considerable
technical work will need to be done at both national and international levels on
identifying what such risks are, what is systemic and what is not, and what kind
of regulatory actions would be effective.
India has adopted a counter-cyclical approach through calibrated increase
in the risk weights and provisioning requirements during the period ofrapki credit
growth. RBI has prescribed the building of buffers such as floating provisions in
good times so that banks are able to use it in adverse circumstances.

Strengthened capital framework: from Basel II to Basel III
In
percentage
of riskweighted
assets

Basel n
Basel m

Capital requirements

Additional
macroprudential
overlay
Common equity
Tier I capital
Total Capital
Countercyclical
buffer
Minimum Conservation Required Minimum Required Minimum Required
Range
buffer
2
4
8
4.5
2,5
7.0
6
8.5
8
10.5
0-2.5
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Under Basel EI, the focus is on making common equity the predominant
form of bank capital and to enhance the loss absorbing capacity of the other
elements of regulatory capital. The concept ofmaking countercyclical provisions
and establishing capital buffers simply implies that banks should build up higher
level of provision and capital in good times which could be run down in times of
economic contraction consistent with safety and soundness considerations. This
will be done by defining buffer ranges above the regulatory minimum capital
requirements.
The Basel committee has evolved a framework to build countercyclical capital
buffers that can act as cushions in times of crisis. Capital distribution constrain
could be inposed on the bank when the capital level falls within the buffer range.
By changing the prescribed capital buffer levels across the banks, the national
supervisory regulator may avoid the scenario of excessive credit growth preceding
a downturn, akin to Alan Greenspan's irrational exuberance', which only
precipitates and accentuates the crisis. Two features of the reform package
warrant special mention because of the communication effort they require. First,
banks across the world are apprehensive that even as they incur the cost of
building the capital buffers they will not be able to use them during a downmrn,
because ironically that is when markets would expect and demand higher capital.
The Basel looks at number ofpossible conditioning variable as indicator of financial
strains. The variables are placed under three categories: Aggregate
macroeconomic Variables, the second measures of banking sector performance
and the third one are proxies for the cost of funding. Among macroeconomic
variables are Real GDP growths. Aggregate real credit growth, credit-to-GDP
ratio. Asset price growth. Among the Banking sector variables are Bank credit
growth, Banking sector profits. Aggregate losses. Among the cost of funding
variables are Banking sector credit spreads (indices), cost of liquidity, corporate
bond spreads (aggregate average) etc. The Basel tries to propose the Credit-toGDP ratio as the best measure for countercyclical capital buffer. But the Indian
situation is different, as per RBI study, the credit to GDP ratio has not historically
been a good indicator of build up of systemic risk in our banking system. Some
economic sectors such as real estate, micro finance and consumer credit are
relatively new in India and banks have recently begun financing them in a big
way. The risk build up in such sector cannot accurately be captured by the
aggregate credit to GDP ratio. (D. Subbarao, RBI governor speech' September,
2010)
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A PROPOSED RESEARCH PROPOSAL IN THE AREA COULD
BE
•

To study and assessflieboundary problems between various financial sectors
& markets. (We assessed the boundary problems between various financial
sectors & markets)

•

Is the pro-cyclicality more observed in Banks with aggressive lending?

•

To suggest changes in the regulatory fi-amework in consonance with the
emerging needs at the national and international level. ( w e looked at the
regulatory fi-amework)

•

To apply behavioral finance theory that says that people are not always
rational. Whether the market participants would act rationally in crisis and
whether or not, the steps taken like capital buffer as a counter cyclical
measure would be defeated. Like there would be under reaction of the
participants during the crisis as they show overconfidence during good times.
What would be the undesirable consequence ofhuman behavior? It has not
been addressed in the proposed regulation. A few market participants are
guided by greed during better times and display widespread fear during
crisis. Could regulation address such issues?

•

The effect of one market on the other markets. For example, the distress
sale in the securities market and the property market leads to shrinkage of
buyers and slowdown of the industrial activity, which in tum leads to lesser
demandfi-omborrowers for bank finance, and also the banks are wary of
lending the property developers. Similarly, the recession in Automotive
industry leads to increased number of default of SME's due to dependence
of a large number of SME's on a single buyer. The Bank is therefore reluctant
to fiarther extend capital to these sectors during crisis, will the proposed
regulations act as a preventive tool against undue optimism but bolster
pessimistic outlook during the crisis?.

•

Is the regulation design effective in counterbalancing the unavoidable and
predictable tendencies of both pubhc and private sectors during periods of
prosperity (when businesses tend to over-extendtiieiractivities and regulators
and policymakers are less likely to rein in them in because of their apparent
success), and periods of decline (when businesses tend to contract and
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regulators and policymakers over-react to the excesses that preceded the
contraction).
•

At what point of time the Banks should release the capital buflFer. Suppose,
a particular bank making losses in good times of the Banking industry. The
issue here is, how we identify the good times and Bad times.

DATAAND METHODOLOGY USED
The study undertaken is one of exploratory research. The various sources
like RBI committee report (Advisory panel on Financial regulation and supervisioncommittee on Financial sector Assessment- March 2009), Basel committee
report, IOSCO principles, G-20 working group, Geneva Report, RBI governor
speech, RBI Data Base, etc. have been used. Another source would be the
Annual reports of various financial institutions, and the Data and disclosure about
Basel implementation, CAR etc.
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